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The Development of the Conceptual
Framework Supporting International
Extradition
VALERIE EPPS*
I. INTRODUCTION
All laws and all legal practices rest upon sets of ideas. In
general, those ideas, which are thought to aid the betterment of
social order, are referred to as contributing to "justice." It is not
the purpose of this Article to swell the vast literature that attempts
to unravel the concept of justice; but rather, to ask on what legal
concepts the idea of international extradition rests. In other
words, what legal constructs are necessary before the idea of
extradition can exist? The Article's second purpose is to examine
how the changing nature of certain underlying concepts resulted in
changes in the nature of extradition law. An understanding of the
framework of ideas that support the notion of international
extradition may shed some light on the changing legal context in
which it exists and how extradition itself has altered to reflect and
adapt to those changes.
II. TWIN RADICAL CONCEPTS UNDERLYING EXTRADITION
TREATIES: No USE OF FORCE AND EQUALITY OF STATES
The history of interstate relationships is dominated by the tale
of interstate warfare. For centuries, states have spent much of
their resources on the acquisition and consolidation of armies and
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munitions. The ability to subdue and rule neighboring or far flung
nations has depended largely on superior arms and better
organized military forces.' Sometimes luck or surprise wins the
day but such accidents of history are the exception, not the rule.
[Although] most major religions have produced doctrines which
define the occasions when fighting a war is justified... [i]t was
not until the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth century that there was any movement to urge the
adoption of universal rules governing interstate warfare....
War was an instrument of state policy and was used when seen
as promoting the state's interests. Despite early efforts of some
international scholars to promote rules governing warfare, it is
fair to say that, prior to the twentieth century, war was beyond
the scope of anything recognizable as law.2
After the devastation of World War I, the failure of the
League of Nations, and the ensuing atrocities and ruin of World
War II, the United Nations was born. One of the main purposes of
the U.N. Charter was "to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war"3 and "to maintain international peace and
security."4 An essential element of those overriding purposes was
to assure the sovereign equality of states. As long as powerful
states were free to overwhelm their weaker neighbors, the threat
of perpetual war would remain. The Charter, therefore, needed
other vital principles. It required states to renounce the use of
force in international relations except for force used in self-
defense,5 but it also established the fundamental concept of the
equality of sovereign states. The Charter reaffirmed "faith in...
the equal rights.., of nations large and small.",6 It further asserted
"the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"
7
1. See, e.g., LAWRENCE JAMES, RAJ: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF BRITISH
INDIA 67, 142-43, 251-52 (1998).
2. VALERIE EPPs, INTERNATIONAL LAW 383 (2d ed. 2001), citing R. A. Markus,
Saint Augustine's Views on the 'Just War' in CHURCH AND WAR 1-13 (W.J. Sheils ed.
1983); JUST WAR AND JIHAD, HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR
AND PEACE IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS (John Kelsay & James Turner
Johnson eds., 1991); HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURI BELLI AC PACIS (A.C. Campbell trans.,
1979) (1625).
3. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
4. Id.
5. Id. art. 2, para. 4, art. 51. The Security Council is also permitted to authorize
member states to use force. See id. art. 42.
6. Id. pmbl.
7. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
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and declared that "the Organization is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its Members."8  Without the twin
radical notions of equality of states and freedom from aggressive
force by powerful states, the whole regime of international treaties
entered into by states on an equal basis, which forms the
fundamental basis for international extradition, 9 could not exist.
Equality of states is one of the linchpins of treaty law.
Without the norm of equality, weaker states are hesitant to enter
into treaties with stronger states, knowing that the stronger state
will only keep its treaty obligations as long as it is deemed
expedient. Thus, trust is the fundamental component of treaty
negotiation and conclusion. Equality of sovereignty is the
necessary norm for trust between states.
Prior to the Charter's prohibition of the use of force and
declaration of the equality of states, nations could, and did, enter
into treaties, including extradition treaties, but these treaties were
often unequal. The more powerful state could always enforce its
will upon the weaker state regardless of treaty provisions.' ° Just as
domestic law prohibiting murder can never ensure that murders
will not occur or that all murderers will be prosecuted,
international law cannot ensure that all of its precepts will be
adhered to or enforced. Nonetheless, the underlying norms of
equality of states and no use of force provide the framework for
the stage on which modern extradition and rendition of criminal
suspects is enacted.
III. SEPARATE SOVEREIGNTIES NECESSITATE EXTRADITION
The idea of international law springs fundamentally from the
concept of the sovereign state. The idea of extradition is
dependent upon the notion of separate sovereign states exercising
jurisdiction only within their territorial borders. Even after the
8. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
9. Although some states have always engaged in extradition without formal treaties,
modern practice is almost wholly dependent on bilateral, or, less frequently, multilateral
treaties. Even where extradition takes place without a written treaty, the success of the
arrangements depends on reciprocal trust for which a written treaty is a more formal
manner of expression.
10. See, e.g., Jesse A. Finkelstein, An Examination of the Treaties Governing the Far-
Eastern Sino-Soviet Border in Light of The Unequal Treaties Doctrine, 2 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 445 (1979); Cornelius Murphy, Economic Duress and Unequal Treaties, 11
VA. J. INT'L L. 51 (1970); Albert H. Putney, The Termination of Unequal Treaties, 21 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 87 (1927).
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Enlightenment of eighteenth-century Europe," when the concept
of the individual as a subject of international law arose, and later
when the individual was gradually seen as having international
legal rights and obligations, the notion of state sovereignty has
persisted as the bedrock of the international legal system.
It is the concept of separation of territory into sovereign
states, with separate spheres of governmental power that makes
the idea of extradition necessary. Extradition is the process of
rendition of fugitive criminals from the state of flight to the state
12having jurisdiction over the alleged crime. Extradition is only
necessary because the two concepts of sovereignty and equality
mandate that one sovereign may exercise no power in the territory
of another sovereign, unless permitted to do so by the territorial
sovereign. 13 An agreement to extradite criminal fugitives is a
formal process to assist another state in the enforcement of its
criminal law. In a sense, it is an agreement to operate as the police
force and the initial judicial hearing officer for the requesting state.
The criminal who is wise enough, or lucky enough, to cross an
international border after committing a crime knows that the
executive of the state having jurisdiction over the crime will not be
14able to chase him once the boundary is crossed, unless the stateto which the fugitive has fled has some process to catch him and
11. See, e.g., THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Penguin Classics 1985) (1791);
CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (David Wallace Carrithers ed., Univ.
of Cal. Press 1977) (1748); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice
Cranston trans., Penguin Classics 1968) (1762).
12. Of course, extradition is not the only method of acquiring jurisdiction over fleeing
offenders. The processes of exclusion, deportation, abduction, and rendition or surrender
all play a role, together with the historic practice of informal modes of delivery of fugitives
by one state to another. See e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular
Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25 (1973);
Steven Coren, Note, Disguised Extradition and Abuse of Process, 110 LAW Q. REV. 393
(1994); Jonathan A. Gluck, Note, The Customary International Law of State-Sponsored
International Abduction and United States Courts, 44 DUKE L.J. 612 (1994); Paul Mitchell,
English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcible Abduction after
Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383 (1996); Paul O'Higgins, Disguised
Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 MOD. L. REV. 521 (1964).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 432
cmt. b (1987). "It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials
of one state may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the
latter's consent." Id.
14. I refer to the fugitive with the masculine pronoun throughout this Article, in part
for economy of words but also because the overwhelming majority of fugitives subject to
extradition are, in fact, men.
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send him back-"ay, there's the rub."'5 The prccess of catching
and sending the criminal back after his successful flight across a
border is the process of extradition and this process has a long
history-a history that largely reflects the changing nature of the
state and its own perceived interests.
Throughout recorded history, most fugitives would have been
quite safe once they left the state within whose jurisdiction the
crime was committed, because most countries did not have
extradition agreements and only a few countries engaged in
rendition through informal processes or based on reciprocity. 16 Of
course, getting across a border might well prove hazardous and
immigration barriers have increasingly prevented such flight,
particularly since the later half of the twentieth century. 17
IV. EXTRADITION CRIMES TEND TO REFLECT THE STATE'S
CENTRAL CONCEPT OF ITSELF
The types of crimes for which extradition has been primarily
sought has reflected the state's concept of itself. If the state is a
theocracy, religious dissidents have been the prime target of
extradition. 8 In contrast, if the state sees itself as a war machine,
the bulk of those extradited are military deserters. 9 Presently,
when a number of highly developed states find themselves under
attack by those they term "terrorists," then criminals, who fall
broadly under one of the numerous definitions of terrorism,' ° are
15. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc.1 (1603). This is not to say that
states have always observed the law restricting their operations in other states. The
capture of Adolf Eichmann by Israeli agents from Argentina to stand trial in Israel, and
the capture of Humberto Alvarez-Machain in Mexico, by U.S. agents, to stand trial in the
United States, are two notorious examples of states exercising their powers in another
state without that state's permission. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R.
277 (S. Ct. 1962) (Israel); U.S. v. Alvaez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
16. For figures on numbers of U.K. extraditions and surrenders from 1894-1995 see
GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS 124 (1998); see also JOHN F. MURPHY,
PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY
INITIATES 109-12 (1985) (demonstrating high levels of prosecution and conviction for
hijackers of U.S. registered aircraft).
17. See, e.g., Victoria Lehrfeld, Comment, Patterns of Migration: The Revolving Door
from Western Mexico to California and Back Again, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 209, 215 (1995).
18. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES
LAW AND PRACTICE 33-34 (4th ed. 2002).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Louise Ren6 Beres, The Meaning of Terrorism -Jurisprudential and
Definitional Clarifications, 28 VAND J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239 (1995); John Dugard, Towards
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the offenders most aggressively subject to extradition or other
forms of rendition.21
Petty criminals are not often subject to extradition, in part
because extradition is an expensive process and application of a
cost-benefit analysis reveals that petty criminals are simply not
worth pursuing. The definition of what constitutes a "petty" crime
almost ensures the result of no extradition. Even if the act is a
violation of the existing criminal code, a society may define the act
as only a "petty" crime, such as fornication, for example. Thus, by
definition, that society does not perceive such an act as
undermining the state in a major way and is not likely to spend its
resources tracking down the offender. On the other hand, if a
state, such as a strictly religious state, defines fornication as a
capital offense, presumably it would see the act as antithetical to
the existence of an ordered society and thus might be expected to
regard such crimes as grave and in need of pursuing across borders
through extradition. It is not, then, the act itself that increases or
decreases the likelihood of extradition. Rather, it is the degree of
seriousness that the state attaches to the act, which correlates to
the perceived necessity for extradition. Acts that are seen as
undermining the core values of the state are the acts that increase
the likelihood of pursuit of the perpetrator beyond the state's
borders.
V. THE HISTORICAL PRACTICE OF EXTRADITION REFLECTS THE
CHANGES IN THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
There are four main phases in the history of extradition:
antiquity until the end of the seventeenth century; eighteenth
century to the first half of the nineteenth century; the latter half of
the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century; and the mid-
twentieth century to the present.22 Each of these periods reflects a
particular concern central to the state's concept of itself.
the Definition of International Terrorism, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (1973) (remarks at the
American Society of International Law's Sixty-Seventh Annual Meeting, April 12-14,
1973); Ali Khan, A Legal Theory of International Terrorism, 19 CONN. L. REV. 945 (1987);
Jordan J. Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the Law, 19 CONN.
L. REV. 697 (1987).
21. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism:
Guantdnamo and Beyond, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 457 (2003).
22. BASSIOUNI, supra note 18, at 33-35; I. A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-19 (1971); Valerie Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender
[Vol. 25:369
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The earliest period most frequently subjected political and
religious offenders to extradition. This was hardly surprising in
light of states' overwhelming concern for the preservation of their
newly emerging power structures, which were primarily based on
religious values and the need to suppress rival political factions.
For example, a run-of-the-mill murderer was not perceived as a
threat to the political order, but, a rival faction, either political or
religious, might harbor the seeds of total annihilation and thus
must be captured and contained.
From the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth
century, extradition treaties focused on military deserters. The
European treaties are instructive.23 Europe, before Waterloo, had
been characterized by continuous wars of acquisition between
groups of states forming alliances and attacking one another. War
was one of the main activities of the state and military deserters
were seen as undermining the core purpose of the state.
The French and American Revolutions gave rise to an
entirely new concept of the state. Government "by the people"
was a radical concept even though the persons included in the
notion of "people" was hardly comprehensive.24 Perhaps the most
fundamental change, advocated in documents such as the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the American
Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S.
Bill of Rights is the notion that the power to govern emanates
from the people and not from the divine right of rulers. In a legal
Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J.
61-63 (1979).
23. See e.g., Convention between the Emperor, France, and the Netherlands for the
Reciprocal Return of Deserters, Apr. 1, 1718, Neth.-Fr., 30 Consol. T.S. 285; Cartel for the
Surrender of Deserters between Austria and Russia, Mar. 24, 1808, Aus.-Russ., 59 Consol.
T.S. 483; Cartel for the Extradition of Deserters between Austria and Modena, Oct. 24,
1818, Aus.-Modena., 69 Consol. T.S. 303; Convention for the Extradition of Deserters
between France and Sardinia, Aug. 9, 1820, Fr.-Sardinia., 71 Consol. T.S. 207; Convention
between Sardinia and Tuscany for the Reciprocal Extradition of Deserters, Dec. 7, 1825,
Sardinia.-Tuscany., 5 Consol. T.S. 465.
24. The term "people" as used in such documents as the U.S. Constitution or the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen only included white, educated,
and propertied males. Jefferson noted in his discussion of the wording of the Declaration
of Independence that "The clause ... reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa,
was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted
to restrain the importation of slaves, and who on the contrary still wished to continue it."
THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1821), reprinted in JEFFERSON WRITINGS 18
(Merrill D. Peterson ed. 1984). American Indians are specifically referred to as "merciless
•.. savages." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
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landscape that was founded on natural law concepts, the bedrock
belief in the divine ordering of authority was being turned on its
head. The divine originator remained, but was now seen as vesting
power in the individual. Law was only legitimate in so far as it
expressed the will of the people. As a result, extradition treaties
during this period began to provide some protections for the
individual, most notably through the political offense exception to
extradition.
When an individual escaped from a state with a non-
representative system of government (i.e. all governments until
well into the twentieth century) and when his crime was directed
against the state, the "enlightened" state of refuge would not send
the perpetrator back to the benighted state. The perpetrator who
had tried to overthrow an existing government and put another
government in its place (or who had committed a common crime
in the course of such efforts)25 was considered a criminal in the
country from which he had fled, but was welcomed as a hero in the
country of refuge. He had struck a blow for freedom from
tyranny. He had supported the new idea of the representative
state. The Belgians and the French were the first to introduce the
idea of protecting the political offender and specifically excepted
the dlit politique from extradition in their joint treaty of 1834.26
The United States' policy of protecting political offenders from
extradition did not appear until it signed a treaty with France in
1843.7 By the late nineteenth century, the political offense
exception had become a standard U.S. treaty clause and remained
so until the end of the twentieth century.
The final phase of extradition law, running from the middle of
the twentieth century to the present, has shown an increasing
concern with the rights of the fugitive. The U.N. Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 8 heralded the era of
human rights. This era ushered in the idea that individuals had
rights springing from their personhood and that governments must
not interfere with those rights (negative rights, e.g. freedom from
torture29 or arbitrary arrest 30 ) and later, that governments had
25. This is the classic definition of the relative political offense.
26. Extradition Treaty, Nov. 22, 1834, Belg.-Fr., art. 5, 84 Consol. T.S. 457,462.
27. Treaty of Extradition, Nov. 9, 1843, U.S.-Fr., art. 4, 8 Stat. 580.
28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
29. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, 999
[Vol. 25:369
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obligations to ensure certain rights (positive rights, e.g., the right
to education,3 work,32 or health3 3). More recently, the human
rights movement has championed certain group rights (e.g. the
right to culture 4 and language35 ). Finally, the notion of individual
obligations enforceable under international law has taken root.
Although the Nuremburg36 and Tokyo37 trials represented early
assertions of the principle of individual obligations, the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 38 the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR)39 and the International Criminal Court (ICC)'
1
have established and expanded that principle. With an emphasis
on human rights, it is not surprising that extradition treaties have
begun to reflect concern for the way the fugitive is treated in the
extradition process.
VI. EXTRADITION PRACTICE IN THE ERA OF THE STATE AS THE
PROTECTOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Restriction of the Political Offense Exception
Towards the end the 1970s, a movement began that favored
abolishing the political offense exception4 largely because it was
perceived as no longer protecting fighters for freedom, but rather,
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
30. See ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 9.
31. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. 13, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
32. See id. art. 6.
33. See id. art. 12.
34. See ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 27; ICESCR, supra note 31, art. 15.
35. See ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 27.
36. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis Powers, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into
force Aug. 8, 1945).
37. See Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589 (amended Apr. 26, 1946).
38. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48" Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES 827 (1993) (amended by
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998)) [hereinafter ICTY].
39. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49' Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter
ICTR].
40. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
41. Epps, supra note 22, at 82.
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as providing safe haven to those who bombed buildings, murdered
civilians, and hijacked aircraft to achieve political ends.4 ' The
world gradually recognized that an exception to extradition, which
had originally protected the human rights of the fugitive, was being
used to trample human rights of the victims. The dilemma was
resolved through a series of multilateral conventions and
numerous bilateral treaties that describe specific acts which,
regardless of their motivation, will be subject to extradition and
will not count as political offenses. 43 By abolishing or limiting the
political offense exception, states are eager to prevent the
extradition system from protecting the fugitive to the detriment of
other individual's right to life.
B. Refusal to Extradite on the Grounds of Nationality
In the era of human rights states have, however, emphasized
protections for the fugitive. Many states, particularly civil law
countries, simply refuse to extradite their own nationals fearing
harsh treatment by a foreign government. In such instances, the
home state prosecutes the fugitive if there is a basis for
jurisdiction. Fortunately, most civil law countries assert
jurisdiction over crimes based on nationality." Thus, the fact that
the offense did not take place in the fugitive's home state is not a
barrier to prosecution. The fugitive, however, gains the comfort of
being prosecuted in his own country, usually in his native
language, or a language he understands, and through a process
with which he is, presumably, more familiar. He will also be able
to serve the prison sentence in his own country and possibly
42. "The easiest solution to the dilemma is simply to drop the political offender
exception in extradition treaties." Id. at 87.
43. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hijacking), Dec. 16,1970, art. 7, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force Oct.
14, 1971) [hereinafter Hijacking Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, art. 7, 24 U.S.T. 565
(entered into force Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter Sabotage Convention]; International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR, at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/34/146 (1980), 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force June 3, 1980)
[hereinafter Hostages Convention]; Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985,
U.S.-U.K., art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 8468, at 2 (entered into force Dec. 23, 1986); Supplementary
Treaty on Extradition, April 27, 1987, U.S.-Belg., arts. 2-6, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-8
(1997) (entered into force Sept. 1, 1997).
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
U.S. § 402 n. 1, 242 (1987) (also citing Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 835-36 (2nd ed. 1987)).
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receive the support of family members and friends throughout his
prosecution and prison term.
C. Refusal to Extradite Based on the Rule of Speciality
The defense of speciality, under which the requesting state
may only try the fugitive for the specific offenses for which he was
extradited, also provides the fugitive with a particular form of
protection. While it is true that the requesting state can try the
fugitive for crimes other than the crimes for which he was
extradited, the fugitive must be afforded a reasonable period of
time to leave the country before such prosecution can commerce.
The rule of specialty, therefore, protects the fugitive by limiting his
prosecutorial exposure after extradition.
D. Refusal to Extradite Because of Incarceration Conditions or
Type of Sentence
More recent cases have focused on the conditions under
which a fugitive is held pending and after trial and the range of
penalties the fugitive may suffer. In the Soering litigation, the
European Court of Human Rights ultimately held that Britain
would violate her obligations under the European Convention on
Human Rights if she extradited Soering (a German citizen) to the
United States. Soering was charged with the capital offense of
murder, and if convicted, would be kept on death row for years
due to lengthy appeals. Additionally, death row conditions in U.S.
jails were deemed inhumane.
As more states have become parties to an increasing array of
human rights treaties, states have found themselves with the
possibility of conflicting treaty obligations. For example, a state
may be obligated to extradite under an extradition treaty but may
violate various human rights obligations if it does in fact extradite
45. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989). The court held that
extraditing Soering from the United Kingdom to the United States on a capital charge
would violate art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because of the
conditions in which he would be held on death row); European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3. 213
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (stating "No one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."). After the court's
decision, the authorities in Virginia amended the charges to remove the capital offense
and the United Kingdom extradited Soering to the United States for trial.
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the fugitive to a country not meeting the required norms.46 The
trend is to honor the fugitive's human rights obligations rather
than the extradition obligation.
E. The Re-Negotiation of Treaties to Protect Fugitives
In the wake of more protective human rights standards, states
have also sought to renegotiate treaties. This has been particularly
true with regard to the death penalty. Starting at the beginning of
the 1960s, a large human rights movement, often spearheaded by
non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International,
sought to abolish the death penalty. At the present time, roughly
two-thirds of all states no longer administer the death penalty as
punishment for crimes. These states are understandably reluctant
to extradite fugitives to countries that may impose a death
sentence. Initially attempting diplomatic negotiation, abolitionist
states have essentially told death penalty states that they will not
extradite fugitives unless the death penalty states reduce the
charges to non-capital offenses or guarantee that fugitives will not
be subject to the death penalty. This strategy has been successful
on occasion, as in the Soering Case.47 More recently, abolitionist
states have begun renegotiating treaties and have reserved the
right to refuse extradition if the fugitive would be subject to the
death penalty.48
F. Attacking the Rule of Non-Inquiry
The rise in protections for the fugitive has also battered the
rule of non-inquiry, which asserts that the magistrate or judge
hearing the extradition case in the requested state will not inquire
into the procedures to be followed in the requesting state. This
rule grew out of the sense that if a state was willing to enter into an
46. See Stephan Breitenmoser & Gunter E. Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The
Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 845, 879-83 (1990); Michael P. Shea, Expanding
Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L.
85, 129 (1992).
47. See Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 467; see e.g., John Pak, Note, Canadian
Extradition and the Death Penalty: Seeking a Constitutional Assurance of Life, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239 (1993).
48. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, U.S.-Can., Dec. 3, 1971, art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983
(entered into force Mar. 22, 1976); Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 8, 31
U.S.T. 5059 (entered into force Jan. 25, 1980); see also, William A. Schabas, Indirect
Abolition: Capital Punishment's Role in Extradition Law and Practice, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L
&COMP. L. Rev. 581(2003).
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extradition treaty with another state, its political departments
would have already made the policy decision that surrender of
fugitives to that state was compatible with overall notions of
fairness. In the United States, that initial policy decision would
also have been subject to a two-thirds Senate vote and subsequent
presidential ratification in the treaty making process. " It was then
considered improper for the judiciary to second-guess the
decisions of the political branches once they had laid down the
language in a treaty obligating the United States to extradite
fugitives. The rule of non-inquiry is a facet of the political
question doctrine, although no court, to my knowledge, has ever
stated that the determination whether or not to extradite a fugitive
is solely for the political branches to decide.0 When an extradition
treaty exists, courts have traditionally deemed themselves
obligated by the treaty promise, regardless of the nature of the
regime (both political and judicial) to which the fugitive is being
returned. This "hands-off" approach is coming under attack.5'
The new role of the state as a protector and promoter of
individual rights facilitated the rise of the state as the protector of
the fugitive in the extradition process. States were still ready to
return criminals for prosecution, but only after assuring that the
fugitives' core rights would be protected. As the state's role
changed, so did the extradition process.
VII. THE DEMISE OF SOVEREIGNTY
The rise of the nation-state and its gradually changing sense
of itself have now entered a new phase, one that might well be
described as the era of the demise of sovereignty. The confidence
with which states have been able to insist on the guarantee of
certain human rights norms for fugitives was made possible
because the individual state is part of a much larger group of states
sharing the same values. This has been true even when extradition
treaties have not provided for such human rights guarantees, and
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although extradition treaties are almost invariably
sent to the Senate for a two-thirds vote, such treaties could be the subject of an executive
agreement, which does not require such "advice and consent."
50. The Secretary of State retains the final determination whether or not to extradite
once a court has decided that the fugitive can be extradited. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1993); see
also In Re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 13,563).
51. See John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on
Extradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401, 438 (1990).
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even when the requesting state has been considerably more
powerful than the requested state. The human rights system
emerged through the broad agreement by many states on the
necessity for a common set of norms52 and the gradual evolution of
enforcement mechanisms.53
Groups of states have entered into regional alliances and
delegated powers to supranational bodies. The most highly
developed regional organization is the European Union,54 which
now regulates everything from tariffs to the definition of chocolate
for its members. Other supranational organizations exist on a
worldwide basis to govern particular areas of human activity such
as the World Trade Organization,55 which sets the governing norms
for international trade.
This movement towards subsuming the state into larger
governing structures is reflected in extradition law by the
emergence of multilateral extradition treaties and by the
requirement that states surrender individuals within their
jurisdiction to supranational entities such as the ICTY, the ICTR
and the ICC.
VIII. THE STATE AS A PART OF A MULTISTATE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. The Emergence of the Multilateral Extradition Treaty
Traditionally, extradition treaties have been bilateral
agreements that came about as the result of bilateral negotiations.
Crime was perceived as largely a concern of individual nations.
When a criminal fled, the individual nation where the fugitive was
52. The norms are usually represented in multilateral treaties. These treaties now
cover an astonishing range of topics from, for example, the prohibition of genocide,
Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12 1951), to the protection of children,
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Sept. 2, 1990).
53. The range of enforcement mechanisms runs from mere reporting, see, e.g.,
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 52, art. 44, to the right of the individual
to sue his or her state, see, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman on
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 29, art. 22.
54. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct 11, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 145 (incorporating amendments to the original treaty on the European
Union).
55. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143-52 (1994).
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found would return the fugitive for prosecution. As long as crime
was largely local, the system worked quite well. With the massive
increase in the movement of goods and people, and the rise of the
multinational corporation, particularly since the middle of the
twentieth century, crime was bound to become international in
scope.
Although large numbers of bilateral treaties can cover what a
single multilateral treaty on the same subject covers, states find it
increasingly beneficial to negotiate multilateral treaties addressing
a variety of criminal matters, while makin provisions for
extradition within those multilateral treaties. The treaties
usually: define particular offenses; broaden the scope of traditional
bases of jurisdiction; obligate states to prosecute or extradite
offenders; and agree that the treaty itself shall serve as an
extradition treaty if the parties in question lack an extradition
treaty between them. These multilateral treaties cover a large
number of offenses, from hostage taking57 to the smuggling of
nuclear materials, 8 and employ extradition as a cornerstone of
their enforcement mechanism. The need to tackle crime at the
international level has necessitated these treaties, while extradition
has provided the key to enforcement.
There are also some regional multilateral extradition
conventions. The European states, which had carried out
extradition through a large number of bilateral treaties, all with
slight variations in their obligations, decided that a uniform set of
extradition requirements would be more effective. To that end,
the European Convention on Extradition59 was adopted and
ratified by almost all of the members of the Council of Europe, as
well as by two non-members. 6° Similarly, the Inter-American
Convention on Extradition provides a multilateral extradition
56. See, e.g., Hijacking Convention, supra note 43, art. 8; Sabotage Convention. supra
note 43, art. 8; Hostages Convention, supra note 43, art. 10.
57. Hostages Convention, supra note 43.
58. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,080 (entered into force Feb. 8, 1987).
59. European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 24 (entered
into force April 18, 1960).
60. Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of a Treaty, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/searchsig.asp?NT=098&CM=8&DF=25/02/03 (last
visited Sept. 21. 2003).
61. Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, OEA/Ser.A/36 (SEPF)
(entered into force March 28, 1992).
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system for members of the Organization of American States. As
more states collaborate in regional organizations, the number of
multilateral extradition treaties can be expected to increase.
B. The Surrender of Sovereignty Eliminates the Need for
Extradition
If regional groups of states ultimately surrender some, or all,
of their sovereignty, the need for the process of international
extradition, as we now know it, will disappear. If Europe, for
example, ever moves towards a uniform criminal law system with
unified enforcement mechanisms, extradition would no longer be
necessary. The current European Convention on Extradition has
a few tentative moves towards uniform enforcement. A number of
its articles create a common standard: Article 12 (the request for
extradition and supporting documents); Article 13 (supplementary
information); Article 16 (provisional arrest); and Article 20
(handing over property.)
62
The disappearance of extradition in a hypothesized Europe
demonstrates, once again, how extradition requires separate
sovereignties to exist. As states form unions, extradition is
modified. Once separate sovereignties no longer exist (or at least
no longer exist in criminal law or criminal law enforcement)
extradition dies.
IX. THE STATE AS PART OF A UNIVERSAL SYSTEM OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
Although multilateral and bilateral extradition treaties will
remain the predominate enforcement mechanism for the surrender
of criminals who have violated domestic law and fled out of state,
the 1990s saw major developments in the prosecution of
individuals for the violation of international criminal law. The
Security Council decided to establish the ICTY
63 and the ICTR, 64
and states created the ICC by becoming parties to the Rome
Convention.65
62. European Convention on Extradition, supra note 59, art. 28, para. 3 (mutual
execution of warrants of arrest in connection with the Convention and bilateral
agreements).
63. ICTY, supra note 38.
64. ICTR, supra note 39.
65. Rome Statute, supra note 40.
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Although the concept of universal jurisdiction had embraced
such crimes as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity,
so that any state could try the perpetrator regardless of any
connection with the events, very few states in fact chose to exercise
such jurisdiction. Too often those who carried out serious
violations of international criminal law would either remain in
power, ensure for themselves a grant of amnesty, or escape to a
place where they could not be prosecuted. Weak regimes with the
moral courage to try such perpetrators might well fear the
consequences.
The solution was the creation of international courts with
jurisdiction over the most serious offenses. Despite the doubts
about the Security Council's ability to create such courts, 66 the
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals have handed down a growing
body of judgments against individuals for the violation of
international crimes as defined in their statutes. The ICC, which
may well hear its first case within a year, will no doubt follow suit.
All three of these international courts have required the creation
of a new regime for the surrender of individuals charged with
crimes by a prosecutor.
Traditional extradition is a state-to-state process. Surrender
of indictees to an international tribunal is a state-to-international
entity process. There are a number of articles that address the
topic of surrender to the ICTY and the ICTR67 and more recently
the surrender mechanism envisioned for the ICC.68 Rendition or
surrender of criminals has entered a new phase reflective of
sovereign states' relationships to newly created international
entities. Some states have resisted cooperation with these new
international courts. Yugoslavia, recently renamed Serbia-
Montenegro, initially resisted all cooperation with the ICTY but
gradually a number of the country's leaders during the Balkan war,
including Slobodan Milogevic have either surrendered to the
66. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1 AR72 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugoslavia
Oct., 2, 1995) (decision on the defense motion for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction),
available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/fallOl/intl-law/protected/unit6/
Prosecutor_v_tadic%20-%20edited.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
67. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Trial and Error: An Assessment of the First Judgment
of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL. 167 (1998); Shawn
Smith, Note, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: An Analysis on Jurisdiction,
23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 231 (1997).
68. See, e.g, G6ran Sluiter, The Surrender of War Criminals to the International
Criminal Court, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 605 (2003).
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Tribunal voluntarily or been subject to forcible arrest and
rendition. Political will on the part of individual states, and on the
part of the larger community of states, is essential for these
tribunals to gain jurisdiction over reluctant indictees who live in
resistant states.
Other states, notably the United States, have embraced and
endorsed the two tribunals established by the Security Council but
have refused to become a party to the ICC.69 The expressed fear
of the United States is that, as a nation with military forces
throughout the world, its troops face the greatest exposure to
prosecution. Since the United States cannot control who is
prosecuted under the ICC's Statute,0 it is not prepared to become
a party to the treaty. The ICC's jurisdiction over indictees is not,
however, dependant on any particular state being party to the
treaty. In light of the ICC's prevailing jurisdiction, the United
States has recently entered into some treaties with foreign states
under which the foreign state agrees not to surrender any U.S.
citizen or member of the U.S. armed forces to the ICC without the
specific permission of the United States.
If we ask what the reluctance of the United States to become
a party to the ICC statute represents in terms of underlying
concepts, the answer lies in the idea of preserving old notions of
separate sovereignty together with the notion that a powerful state
can set its own rules for interstate relationships, in particular, when
it comes to surrendering criminals not only to other nation states
but also to supranational legal entities. It is still too early to tell
69. President William Clinton signed the Rome Treaty on December 31, 1999.
However, President George W. Bush withdrew the U.S. signature on May 6, 2002 in a
letter from John Bolton, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. This letter formally
declared the U.S. intention not to ratify the Rome Treaty and renounced any legal
obligations arising from the U.S. signature of the Treaty. The constitutionality of
presidential withdrawal of the U.S. signature to a treaty had never been addressed by U.S.
courts.
70. Rome Statute, supra note 40 (during the plenipotentiaries conference in Rome
1998, the United States tried very hard, but failed, to have prosecution made subject to
Security Council veto).
71. By April 16, 2003, the American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for
the ICC (AMICC) listed twenty-four states as having concluded such agreements with the
United States, although a number of these agreements are subject to subsequent
parliamentary approval. See AMICC, Bilateral Immunity Agreements, at
http://www.amicc.org/usinfo/administration-policy.html#agreements (last visited Sept. 21,
2003).
386 [Vol. 25:369
2003] International Extradition 387
whether powerful states will be able to remain outside the new
system of rendition to international entities. However, if we
examine the truly remarkable expansion of international law and
international entities since the end of World War II, the
reasonable person might well conclude that extradition and
rendition have entered a new phase and that cooperation, not
recalcitrance, is likely to win the day. A new spirit of sovereign
participation with international entities - not independent
domination of them-may create the path for the "extradition" of
the future.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 25:369
